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GOD'S LITTLEST CHILDREN AND THE RIGHT TO
LIVE:
THE CASE FOR A POSITIVIST PRO-LIFE
OVERTURNING OF ROE
Raymond B. Marcin*
"The word of the LORD came to me, saying,
'Before I formed you in the womb I knew you.'
Jeremiah 1:4-5
"For you created my inmost being;
you knit me together in my mother's womb."
Psalms 139:14
For those who understand that God's littlest children have the same right
to life that all God's children have, the day on which the United States
Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade1 was a day that echoed the grief and
frustration that, more than a century earlier, accompanied the decision in
Dred Scott v. Sandford.2 And the day on which the United States Supreme
Court decides to overturn Roe v. Wade and all the other pro-abortion
decisions will be a day of heart-felt thanksgiving. From the pro-life
perspective, however, it will not be enough, that the Supreme Court merely
overturns Roe v. Wade and the other pro-abortion decisions. It is the thesis
of this article that in order for the right to life of God's littlest children to be
truly and genuinely recognized in our society, the Supreme Court must base
* Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America School of Law; A.B. 1959
Saint John's Seminary; A.B. 1961 Fairfield University; J.D. 1964 Fordham University
School of Law; M.L.S. 1984 The Catholic University of America School of Library and
Information Science; co-author (along with Douglas W. Kmiec, Stephen B. Presser, and
John C. Eastman) of: The American Constitutional Order: History, Cases, and Philosophy
(3d ed. LexisNexis 2009); The History, Philosophy, and Structure of the American
Constitution (3d ed. LexisNexis 2009); and Individual Rights and the American
Constitution (3d ed. LexisNexis 2009).
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
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its overruling on a pro-life rather than (as is more likely) a federalism
rationale.
INTRODUCTION: CAESAR AND GOD
The phrase "God's littlest children" will, no doubt, seem somewhat
anomalous to readers of any article dealing with the law. If surveys mean
anything, however, something like ninety-two percent of the people in the
United States of America believe in God, or at least say they do.3 And it is
probably not much of a stretch to surmise that the vast majority of those
ninety-two percent understand the concept of "God" consistently with one or
another of our three most prevalent religious traditions: Christian, Jewish, or
Islamic. That is, whether Christian, Jew, or Islamic, the average American
probably believes in a God Who is deeply involved in and deeply concerned
with the human condition.4
There are probably several ways of understanding the concept of law, but
perhaps the simplest and most descriptively accurate way of understanding
law is that it represents and describes a fundamental ordering of the human
condition.
If law is profoundly concerned with the human condition, and if the vast
majority of us believe in a God Who is deeply involved in and deeply
concerned with the human condition, a question quite naturally arises: Why
is it that when we teach and study law in our law schools and universities,
we teach and study it as if God were irrelevant to the enterprise - almost as
if we assume that God does not exist at all?
A century ago, Pope Leo XIII made that very point:
"There is no power but from God." [citing Romans 13:1] .... [Yet
t]he authority of God is passed over in silence, just as if there were no
God; or as if He cared nothing for human society; or as if men, in
their individual capacity or bound together in social relations, owed
nothing to God; or as if there could be a government of which the
whole origin and power and authority did not reside in God Himself.
Thus, as is evident, a state becomes nothing but a multitude, which is
its own master and ruler.
5
3. THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION AND PUBLIC LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE
SURVEY 5 (Pew Research Center 2008).
4. According to the Pew survey, sixty percent of Americans believe in a "Personal
God." Id. That is, if one does the math, sixty-four percent of the ninety-two percent who
believe in God believe in a "Personal God."
5. POPE LEO XIIt, IMMORTALE DEI 108, 112 (Claudia lhm ed., The Pieran Press
1981)(1855).
2008
Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy Vol. XXV:38
We have, even within the Christian tradition, ways of rationalizing our
remarkably odd, dismissive attitude towards God. We raise the doctrine of
"separation of Church and State" (a phrase that appears nowhere in the text
of the Constitution) to the status of a civil dogma. Yet did not Jesus Himself
suggest the propriety of a separation between the things of the law and the
things of God with His injunction to render unto Caesar the things that are
Caesar's and to God the things that are God's? 6 Law belongs to Caesar;
morality belongs to God. Most Americans, if asked, would readily accept
that notion as both descriptive and normative of our present mode of social
thought- indeed dogmatically so.
If we pause a moment to think about it, however, we easily realize that
that notion of the separation of law and morality, the one belonging to
government (Caesar), the other to God, is routinely and consciously violated
every day in practice. We look to our legislators to enact moral laws and to
avoid enacting immoral laws, and we look to our courts to interpret laws
consistently with decent moral principles. Law making and law interpreting,
however, are the business of Caesar, and morality is the business of God.
The fact is that we let our law makers and our law interpreters routinely
tamper with the business of God. Do we let God tamper with the business of
our law makers or law interpreters? The dilemma, scarcely faced and
seldom recognized in our society, is that we accept a separation between the
things of Caesar and the things of God - between law and morality - and yet
we operate under a system that authorizes, indeed requires, Caesar to tamper
with the business of God - morality - and forbids God to tamper with the
business of Caesar. Our society's current operative solution to that dilemma
is to make both law and morality the business of Caesar and to wipe God out
of the picture. We teach and study law and the interactions between law and
morality as if God were irrelevant - almost (as Pope Leo XIII put it) as if
there were no God at all.
That is not a happy solution to the dilemma. It is more an avoidance than
a solution, and it leaves us all in an anomalous situation. The vast majority
of us believe in a God Who is deeply concerned with the human moral
condition, and essentially that same majority also seems to accept the
elimination of God from the law-enacting and law-interpreting contexts
where morality - the business of God - has its input. Perhaps the most
glaringly obvious example of the dilemma was the decision in Roe v. Wade
engrafting onto the Constitution the right to kill God's littlest children -
children whom He knew before He formed them in their mothers' wombs -
6. Matthew 22:21.
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children whose inmost being He created and whose bodies He knit together
in their mothers' wombs.
THE NATURAL LAW
As strong as the foregoing points may resonate in the minds of those who
accept the Bible as the word of God, those points are indeed irrelevant in our
society's system of government and jurisprudence, where law making and
law interpreting (and in effect morality itself) are the business of Caesar.
Thus, if those points are to have any favor, they must be clothed in the
language and in the concepts that Caesar accepts.
Natural law theory is probably as old as human speculative and practical
thinking. Even in its organized written form, it antedates the Catholic
natural law tradition, and indeed Catholicism itself, by hundreds of years. It
was the mainstay of Greek and Roman as well as Eastern political and legal
thought.8 Its Westernized and Christianized form found expression in the
philosophical and theological writings of Saint Augustine, Saint Thomas
Aquinas, and the early Catholic scholastic philosophers. 9 The time is long
gone, however, when one could, in our modem system, appeal to the rich
historical and theological pedigree of the great Western natural law
tradition,10 which traces the origin of law to the very essence of God
7. "The word of the LORD came to me, saying, 'Before I formed you in the womb I
knew you."' Jeremiah 1:4-5. "For you created my inmost being; you knit me together in
my mother's womb." Psalms 139:14.
8. See, e.g., Anton-Hermann Chroust, The Philosophy of Law of the Early Sophists,
20 AM. J. JURis. 81 (1975); Natural Law and "According to Nature" in Ancient
Philosophy, 23 AM. J. JURIS. 73 (1978); Joseph P. Maguire, Plato's Theory of Natural
Law, 10 YALE CLASSICAL STUDIES 151 (1947).
9. See, e.g., Anton-Hermann Chroust, The Fundamental Ideas in Saint Augustine's
Philosophy of Law, 18 AM. J. JURIS. 57 (1973).
10. Natural law jurisprudence suggests the existence of a higher law to which all
human law, whether in the form of legislation or case law, is subservient and on which all
human law depends for its validity. Natural law jurists purport to discover this higher
law in understandings of human nature itself. Natural law jurisprudence has a history of
a connection with religious views of law and justice. See, e.g., 2 THOMAS AQUINAS,
SUMMA THEOLOGICA, qq. 90-97 at 993-1024 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province
trans., Christian Classics 1981) (1911). In both its later and earlier forms, however, some
forms of natural law jurisprudence existed without reference to religious doctrine. See
MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, CICERO's COMMONWEALTH BOOK II1, in I THE POLITICAL
WORKS OF MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO 253-79 (Francis Barham trans., 1841); HUGO
GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI Ac PACIS LIBRI TRES, in THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
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Himself, and which formed the basis for all of Western jurisprudence for
more than a millennium, well into the modem era.
There is a sense, however, in which a form of natural law jurisprudence is
still with us. The version of natural law jurisprudence that is still with us
does not, however, enjoy that rich historical and theological pedigree of the
great natural law tradition, which traces the origin of law to the very essence
of God Himself, and which formed the basis for all of Western jurisprudence
for more than a millennium. The version of natural law jurisprudence that
we have come to accept bases itself not in the mind of God, but rather in the
mind of Caesar - that is to say, in the present scheme of things, ultimately in
the minds of any five agreeing members of the United States Supreme Court.
An orientation centered on God is not, of course, the starting point or even a
focal point in today's postmodern version of natural law jurisprudence.
Quite the contrary. The starting premise and indeed the main focal point of
the postmodem thinking that has come to dominate the Supreme Court is,
perhaps, best exemplified by Justice O'Connor's now well known
description of the heart of constitutional liberty in the context of the abortion
decision: "At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.""
The important thing in the Court's current post-modem view, exemplified in
Justice O'Connor's dictum, is not reality per se, but rather "one's own"
concept of reality. And, if we accept Justice O'Connor's subjective post-
modem humanism as valid, each one of us has the constitutional right to
define that reality for one's self. The result is a public philosophy founded
on a reality, or more properly a set of individualized realities, divorced from
objectivity itself and even from the idea of objective truth or objective
reality. In a sense, taken to its logical conclusion, Justice O'Connor's
dictum bespeaks a philosophical outlook either centering God in the human
individual (or rather in each and every one of a chaotic gaggle of diversely
(James Brown Scott ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1925). Positivist jurisprudence suggests that
law is confined to that which is "posited" or declared to be such by an authority
competent to do so. See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (Hafner Press 1948) (1781). In the context of
the issues involved in Roe v. Wade, a natural law approach would find the rights being
discussed, whether the pregnant woman's right to privacy in the abortion decision or the
right to life of the fetus or unborn child, in higher-law-type understandings of humanness,
without any necessary reference to the Constitution, whereas a positivist approach would,
for its conclusions regarding those rights, rely on the concepts and principles which are
found in the Constitution, and would eschew any appeal to a higher-law concept.
11. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (emphasis
added).
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opinionated human individuals) or in recognizing each human individual as
a "god" - but a very uncomfortable "god," a "god" who is in potential
conflict with innumerable other "gods" whose claims to rights to define
reality are just as valid as one's own.
Traditional Western Christian natural law jurisprudence, on the other
hand, disagrees fundamentally with Justice O'Connor's post-modernism.
Although recognizing and defending human liberty, 12 traditional natural law
jurisprudence does not divorce that liberty from truth or reality or
objectivity. Instead, the traditional natural law theory that historically
formed the basis of Western jurisprudence for more than a millennium
grounds reality first on logical proofs of the existence of the transcendent
God, 13 and then grounds human liberty in a system that accepts objective
truth and reality. One should not be overly sanguine about the possibility of
reconciling the two starting points, i.e., the postmodern, exemplified in
Justice O'Connor's dictum, and the traditional, grounded in the acceptance
of an objective reality. They are fundamentally at odds. And yet there is a
strange and discomforting connection between the two, i.e., between the
subjective moral relativism that lurks in Justice O'Connor's dictum and the
objective realism that inhabits traditional natural law jurisprudence.
One contemporary commentator has observed, with reference to the topic
at hand, that
[t]he moral discourse of the public sphere abounds with the rhetoric of
natural law, to be sure; but it is terribly degraded. The most serious
setbacks in our political and legal order have been done in the name
of natural law, abortion rights being the most evident, but by no
means the only, case in point.'
4
It is not much of a secret that, despite the dauntless efforts of the few strict
constructionists and original intentists that still exist in our society,
American constitutional law has ceased to be what it once was - a set of
written principles to be changed only through the use of the constitutional
amendatory process.' 5 It may not be inaccurate to suggest that the United
12. See, e.g., I THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, q. 83 at 417-21 (Fathers of
the English Dominican Province trans., Christian Classics 1981) (1911).
13. See id. q. 2, art. 3, at 13-14.
14. Russell Hittinger, Veritatis Splendor and the Theology of Natural Law, in
VERITATIS SPLENDOR AND THE RENEWAL OF MORAL THEOLOGY 123 (J. A. DiNoia, 0. P. &
Romanus Cessario, 0. P., eds., Midwest Theological Forum 1999).
15. U.S. CONST. Art. V.
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States Supreme Court has become, in effect, an ongoing constitutional
convention, creating something like a case-law constitution alongside the
written Constitution. In a sense, it is all very much a natural-law-type
enterprise (albeit a flawed and "terribly degraded" one) - an effort to
discover the fundamental moral principles that ought to govern our society
in a source other than the written words of the Constitution or the will of the
Constitution-makers, and an effort by the Justices to tap into a fundamental
understanding of human nature and the principles of social organization that
flow therefrom. In the process, of course, the Justices do nod cursorily
toward the text of the written Constitution and its legislative history; but
everybody understands that the real source of the new fundamental moral
norms is not so much what is in the Constitution as the Justices' own
thoughts about what should be in the Constitution.'
6
The flaw in the enterprise, however, from the vantage point of legal
philosophy, is that when the Justices engage in this "terribly degraded"
natural-law process of constitution-making - this quest for the fundamental
moral norms that ought to govem our society - they do not look where the
rich historical and theological pedigree of the great natural law tradition
would lead them - to the moral law that has its source in the very mind of
God. They rummage elsewhere - among their own individual systems of
political beliefs, among the residues of our society's deteriorating moral
value structure, or among the dogmas and intimidations of a "political-
correctness" movement.
The fact is that the great natural law tradition that had ruled Western
jurisprudence for more than a millennium no longer dominates the scene. In
its place we are left with a positivist and very pragmatic and subjective
system based, in the context of the question at hand, i.e., the possible
overturning of Roe v. Wade, on counting the votes of the nine members of
the United States Supreme Court.
A POSITIVIST RIGHT TO LIFE
The current composition of the Supreme Court may suggest to some that
there is a real, if problematic, possibility for the overturning of Roe - the fly
in the ointment being the so-called proverbial swing vote of Justice
16. An example of this phenomenon - perhaps the prime example - is the case at
hand, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), a case in which the United States Supreme
Court first engrafted onto the Constitution a constitutional right to decide to abort a
developing, prenatal baby. The Court purported to locate this right in the "constitutional"
right of privacy, a right that nowhere appears in the text of the Constitution.
Parenthetically, the right to life, which the Court refused to accord to the developing, pre-
natal baby, appears twice in the very text of the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amends.
V, XIV.
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Kennedy. In that context, i.e., that there is a genuine possibility that a
majority of the members of the Court might be willing to overturn Roe, it is
incongruous to realize that the last challenge is not the minds of the pro-
abortion faction on the Court - or even the mind of the swing-voting Justice
Kennedy, who has dropped a hint or two in his opinions in the two Carhart
cases 17 that he might be close to softening the position that he took in the
Casey decision. No, the last, and somewhat incongruous, challenge would
seem to be the minds of Justices Scalia and Thomas - the two Justices who
have stood four-square for an overturning of the Roe v. Wade line of
decisions ever since they became members of the Court. The trouble is that
Justices Scalia and Thomas have taken a strong positivist stance regarding
both the right to privacy in the abortion decision (they believe, in positivist
terms, that no such right exists in the Constitution) and in effect, by
implication, they have taken an equally strong positivist stance on the right-
to-life issue. Perhaps the most well-known expression of that viewpoint
came in Justice Scalia's separate opinion in the Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey case, where he wrote:
The States may, if they wish, permit abortion on demand, but the
Constitution does not require them to do so. The permissibility of
abortion, and the limitations upon it, are to be resolved like most
important questions in our democracy: by citizens trying to persuade
one another and then voting.'
8
Those sentences express what has come to be known as the "federalism"
position - leaving the resolution of a given issue to the state legislatures.
Leaving the matter of the protection of the lives of God's littlest children to
the tender mercies of the fifty individual state legislatures, however, would
seem to be a problematic solution at best.
Arguments for the overturning of Roe v. Wade can be grouped into two
categories: (1) the positivist "federalism" argument that Justice Scalia
currently favors - the recognition that, contrary to the assertions in the Roe
decision,' 9 nothing in the Constitution protects the right to privacy in the
abortion decision (thus leaving the legislatures free to regulate the matter),
and (2) the mixed positivist-and-natural-law argument that a developing
17. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 956-57 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting);
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
18. 505 U.S. at 980 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in
original).
19. Justice Blackmun, for the majority in Roe, located the right to privacy in the
abortion decision "in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and
restrictions on state action." Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
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prenatal child has a fundamental and unalienable right to life (thus
preventing the legislatures from regulating the matter). The right-to-life
movement's arguments are usually grounded upon the latter, natural law
position. The difficulty for the pro-life movement is that, if the Court
decides to overrule Roe, it will most likely do so using a positivist
"federalism" rationale rather than the mixed positivist-and-natural-law
rationale. The challenge, therefore, and the theme of this article, is to find a
strongly positivist argument in favor of the natural law position.
Attempts have been made to cast a positivist gloss on the argument that
the developing prenatal child has a right to life, usually by identifying the
right to life in question with the rights to life posited in the language of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Those attempts, however, have usually
bogged down in question-begging circularity. The Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments' right to life inures to "persons," and a fetus may or may not
be a person, depending on the medical, philosophical, or theological
perspective one holds. The Roe Court itself, noting the lack of a medical,
philosophical, or theological consensus on the issue of when human life
begins, has declared that the judiciary is not in a position to impose an
answer to the pivotal question as to when human life begins, but the Court
has given a negative answer to the question as to whether the fetus is a
"person" in the constitutional sense. 21
The question of the personhood or non-personhood of the fetus is very
definitely at the heart of the constitutional ruling in the original Roe v. Wade
case. Justice Blackmun put the issue quite clearly in his majority opinion in
Roe v. Wade, where he wrote:
The appellee [i.e., the State of Texas] and certain amici argue that the
fetus is a "person" within the language and meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In support of this, they outline at length and in detail the
well-known facts of fetal development. If this suggestion of
personhood is established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses,
for the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the
Amendment.
22
Justice Blackmun then went on to list every usage of the word "person" in
the Constitution, and drew the conclusion that none of those usages - and
these are Blackmun's words - "indicates, with any assurance, that it has any
20. Id. at 159.
21. Id. at 158.
22. Id. at 156-157 (emphasis added).
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possible pre-natal application. 23 Some may see, in that hedging expression
"with any assurance" an element of doubt, raising an "honest doubt" moral
principle - the basic moral insight that if there is an honest doubt as to
whether a given entity possesses "personhood," any truly humane and
civilized society would and should resolve that doubt in favor of
"personhood" rather than against it. Justice Blackmun, however, took the
positivist position that, if the right to life of the fetus is not specifically
mentioned in the Constitution, it does not exist.
It is in the context of the denial of personhood to the developing prenatal
child that a telling analogy has been drawn between Justice Blackmun's
denial of constitutional personhood to fetuses in his Roe v. Wade opinion in
1973 and Chief Justice Taney's denial of constitutional personhood to
blacks, slave or free, in his well-known Dred Scott v. Sandford opinion in
1856. There have only been two times in the entire history of the Supreme
Court when the Court has denied personhood to any classes of individuals.
The first time was the Dred Scott decision in 1856 and the second was the
Roe v. Wade decision in 1973.
The question of personhood arose in a procedural context in Dred Scott.
The technical question involved the diversity of citizenship jurisdiction in
federal courts and the issue for decision was whether Dred Scott could be
considered a citizen of Missouri so as to have the legal capacity to sue
Sandford, a citizen of New York, in federal court in Missouri. On that issue,
Chief Justice Taney actually held that blacks could not be considered
"citizens" (not even free blacks) because they could not be considered
"people" within the meaning of that word "people" in the Constitution.
These are Chief Justice Taney's words: "[N]either the class of persons who
had been imported as slaves, nor their descendants, whether they had
become free or not, were then acknowledged as part of the people, nor
intended to be included in the general words used in that memorableinstume t [ie.,• - ,,24
instrument [i.e., the Constitution]. The argument, of course, was made
that free blacks - and at least those free blacks who lived in the non-slave
states at the time - must have been considered "people" at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution. At the very worst, the "honest doubt"
sensitivity referred to above should have suggested itself to Chief Justice
Taney, and - so the criticism goes - he should have resolved his "honest
doubt" in favor of personhood (or "people-hood") for blacks. Cowed,
perhaps, by the "political-correctness" intimidation of his day, Chief Justice
Taney ruled that not even free blacks could be considered "people" within
the meaning of the Constitution.
23. Id. at 157 (emphasis added).
24. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407 (emphasis added).
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"POSTERITY" IN THE PREAMBLE
25
Now, back to Justice Blackmun and the original Roe v. Wade opinion.
When Justice Blackmun, in his Roe v. Wade majority opinion, listed every
usage of the word "person" in the Constitution (before concluding that none
of those usages "indicates, with any assurance, that it has any possible pre-
natal application" 26), he actually neglected one usage - a usage that
happened, ironically, to be the one seized upon a century earlier by Chief
Justice Taney. Justice Blackmun did indeed find every instance in which the
exact word "person" appeared, but he neglected one variant of the plural
form of that word "person" - the word "people." The word "people" is
found in the well-known and often-memorized Preamble of the Constitution:
"We the People of the United States, in Order to ... secure the Blessings of
Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of America. 27 The Preamble contains a
clear indication that those who framed the Constitution wanted it to be
interpreted in a way that secured the "Blessings of Liberty" (which
presumably would presuppose the blessing of life) not only to themselves but
also to their yet-to-be-born posterity. In other words, those who framed and
those who adopted the Constitution seemed to be saying in the Preamble that
if a question should arise as to whether a provision of the Constitution
should be interpreted in a way in which the interests of yet-to-be-born
posterity would be taken protectively into account, or in a way in which
those interests would be essentially ignored, the former interpretation should
be the one adopted. That, according to the Preamble of the Constitution,
was the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the intent of those who
adopted the Constitution, i.e., the people of the United States of America.
The framers and those who adopted the Constitution intended to secure the
"Blessings of Liberty," including (by presupposition) the right to life so that
25. Much of the material in the following sections has appeared earlier in Raymond
B. Marcin, "Posterity" in the Preamble and a Positivist Pro-Life Position, 38 AM. J.
JURIS. 273, 275-76 (1993).
26. Roe, 410U.S. at157.
27. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added). Although the Preamble may not be
resorted to as a source of constitutional rights, it may be resorted to as an aid in
interpreting the meaning of rights that are expressly mentioned in the main body of the
Constitution, i.e., the meaning of the right to life in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 218, 219, at 163-64 (abridged ed. 1833).
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those blessings could be enjoyed, by yet-to-be-born "Posterity." 28 If that
argument has any merit, then the very text of the Constitution itself may
support the pro-life interpretive approach.
But to be practical and to "give the devil his due," one must acknowledge
that it would be disingenuous in the extreme to suggest that the word
"Posterity" somehow refers exclusively to fetuses. Quite obviously the
framers and adopters of the Constitution intended the word to refer to the
generations yet to come - the descendants of the people of the United States
of America (and probably not even in an exclusively biological sense). In
that context, however, and even with that gloss of understanding, the clause
represents a textually specific indication that the Constitution was intended,
and presumably should be understood and interpreted, to secure "Blessings
of Liberty" to descendants as yet unborn. Indeed it is not disingenuous to
suggest that the Constitution places two classes of people on a par in terms
of entitlement to the "Blessings of Liberty," i.e., "ourselves" and "our
Posterity," and the word "Posterity" 29 is difficult to define except in terms of
yet-to-be-born persons. To put the matter quite simply, from a textualist
perspective, the conclusion seems inescapable that one of the purposes for
the establishment of our Constitution, identified as such in the Preamble, is
to secure the "Blessings of Liberty" to yet-to-be-born persons.
Here is the point: When Justice Blackmun wrote that none of the usages
of the word "person" in the Constitution "indicates, with any assurance, that
it has any possible pre-natal application," 30 he was incorrect. He had
neglected the usage of that variant plural of the word "person" that appears
in the Preamble -"People" and its association with "Posterity." His
conclusion that none of the usages of the word "person" in the Constitution
"indicates, with any assurance, that it has any possible pre-natal application"
28. The argument that a fetus might be a member of "posterity" first appeared in
James Joseph Lynch, Jr., "Abortion and Inalienable Rights in American Jurisprudence: A
Prospective Policy" (Unpublished Lecture, 1987); referred to in James Joseph Lynch,
Posterity: a Constitutional Peg for the Unborn, 40 AM. J. JuRis. 401, 401 (1995). See
also Marcin, supra note 25, at 293-94 (arguing that attentiveness to the interests of
fetuses (yet-to-be-born "posterity") is consistent with John Rawls' Justice Between
Generations in his A THEORY OF JUSTICE 251-58 (Harvard Univ. Press, rev. ed. 1999)
(1971)).
29. Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines "posterity" as "the off-
spring of one progenitor to the furthest generation" or "descendants," and cites and
quotes the "blessings of liberty" clause in the Preamble to the Constitution as its example.
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1772 (1981).
30. Roe, 410 U.S. at 157.
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is incomplete and therefore flawed - he did not analyze the implications of
the inclusion of "Posterity" in the "We the People" formulation in the
Preamble - and this harks back to his statement: "If this suggestion of
personhood is established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses, for the
fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the
Amendment."31
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE "POSTERITY" REFERENCE
The word "posterity," by the year 1788, could be found in many of the
great documents founding and establishing the governments of the new
incipient states. The Preamble of the Constitution of Massachusetts in 1780,
for example, not only contained a "We . . . the people" clause, but also
recognized "the goodness of the great Legislator of the universe," in
affording the people an opportunity "of forming a new constitution of civil
government for ourselves and posterity." 32 Pennsylvania's Constitution of
1776, completed on September 28, 1776, contained a similar reference to
"posterity," announcing that "it is our indispensable duty to establish such
original principles of government, as will best promote the general happiness
of the people of this State, and their posterity .... 33
The original and most helpful reference to "posterity" in the context of the
emerging independence movements, however, came at the very end of the
Colonial Era, in June of 1776 in the Virginia Declaration of Rights.
34
Drafted by George Mason, who was later to become one of Virginia's
delegates to the Federal Constitutional Convention of 1787, the Virginia
Declaration of Rights proclaimed in its Preamble that the rights declared in
the purview of the instrument "do pertain to them [i.e., 'the good people of
31. Id. at 156-57.
32. THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER
ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 957 (Perley Poore ed., 1877) [hereinafter
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS].
33. Id. at 1541.
34. Earlier references to "posterity" in the context of fundamental rights declarations
exist. "The Body of Liberties of the Massachusets Collonie in New England" of 1641
contains an example: "We hould it ... our dutie and safetie whilst we are about the
further establishing of this Government to collect and expresse all such freedomes as for
present we foresee may concerne us, and our posteritie after us . I. "  THE FOUNDER'S
CONSTITUTION 428 (Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner, eds., 1987) (emphasis added).
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Virginia'] and their posterity, as the basis and foundation of government. 35
The first substantive clause of the Virginia Declaration of Rights mentions
"posterity" in strongly operative terms:
[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have
certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of
society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity;
namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring
and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and
safety.
36
The emphasized language gains some importance when one realizes that
at the time the original body of the United States Constitution was approved,
there was no "Bill of Rights" in it. Thus the "Blessings of Liberty" clause
can only have been understood either in the positivist context of the then
extant state declarations and bills of rights or in natural law understandings
of fundamental human rights. If the clause is understood in the positivist
context, it is clear that at least some of the state declarations and bills of
rights gave the term "posterity" genuine operative significance. For
example, under Virginia's Declaration of Rights, the government could not
divest "posterity" of certain rights, specifically the rights to life and liberty.
Two ARGUMENTS
Two arguments suggest themselves as a result of the analysis thus far, one
a somewhat aggressive argument, and the other a bit less ambitious. The
aggressive argument would be based on the fact that the word "Posterity"
includes (but, of course, is not limited to) the developing prenatal child or
fetus. That argument would go something like this: The "People of the
United States" in 1788, when they ordained and established the Constitution,
did so in order to secure the blessings of liberty to their yet-to-be-born
descendants. Their yet-to-be-born descendants included those who were
then in utero as well as the innumerable generations yet to come into
existence. Both classes of descendants fit in under the term "Posterity." In
this argument, the Preamble clause is urged as a textually demonstrable
indication that the Constitution was intended to secure "Blessings of
Liberty" for fetuses. Under this argument the full weight of the Preamble
stands behind the proposition that "Posterity" (in the form both of not-yet-
existent descendants and existent-but-not-yet-born descendants) merits the
"Blessings of Liberty." This argument, however, is somewhat flawed: partly
because it proves too much (carried to its logical conclusion, it would undo
35. FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 32, at 1908 (emphasis added).
36. Id. (emphasis added).
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both Griswold37 and Eisenstadt3s because there is no textual reason why the
"Blessings of Liberty" do not inure to the yet-to-be conceived portion of
"Posterity"); and partly because it gives direct operative effect to the
Preamble, and the Preamble, as we shall see infra, cannot be used as an
independent source of constitutional rights and powers, but can only be used
to elucidate those which do appear in the purview of the Constitution.
The less ambitious argument would be less textualist in scope, and would
draw on the oft-used "spirit and reason" rule 39 as well as the more
contemporary 0urposive, narrative, or "evolutive" models of legislative
interpretation. It would allow that the ordainers and establishers of the
Constitution might not have had the specific problem of the right to life of
existent-but-not-yet-born descendants in mind, whether because abortion
was not then a current issue or because they simply intended a reference to
future generations in a generalized sense. Even under those hypotheses,
however, the clause is an indication that the ordainers and establishers
wanted the Constitution to be understood into the indefinite future to be as
much "posterity"-oriented as "selves"-oriented.
4 1
Under this analysis, admittedly less ambitious than the former, the Court,
when faced with an interpretive question which could be resolved in a way
37. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
38. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
39. See, e.g., Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).
40. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 613-18
(1988); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); Dennis M. Patterson, Law's
Pragmatism: Law as Practice & Narrative, 76 VA. L. REV. 937 (1990).
41. Justice Joseph Story, writing specifically about the "Blessings of Liberty to
ourselves and our Posterity" clause, observed:
[S]urely no object could be more worthy of the wisdom and ambition of the best
men of any age. If there is any thing, which may justly challenge the admiration
of all mankind, it is that sublime patriotism, which looking beyond its own
times, and its own fleeting pursuits, aims to secure the permanent happiness of
posterity by laying the broad foundations of government upon immovable
principles of justice .... [T]here is a noble disinterestedness in that forecast,
which disregards present objects for the sake of all mankind, and erects
structures to protect, support, and bless the most distant generation.
STORY, supra note 27, at 189.
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in which the concept of "posterity" is (1) taken positively and protectively
into account, that is, an interpretation which is posterity-oriented, at least in
part, or (2) ignored or treated negatively, would in light of the "Blessings of
Liberty" clause ordinarily choose the former. This argument is more
negative than positive in its casting, stressing only that interpretations which
ignore or treat negatively the interests of posterity, or which fail to put
posterity on the same level as "selves," are very likely not in accord with the
spirit of the Constitution. It does not suggest that posterity has. some
affirmative claim to rights or entitlements. As applied to the Roe decision,
however, the argument carries some force. In Roe the Court was faced with
42at least two plausible choices, one of which - extending fourteenth-
amendment right-to-life coverage to fetuses - was posterity-oriented in that
it would have taken the interests of a portion of posterity positively and
protectively into account, and the other of which - withholding fourteenth-
amendment right-to-life coverage from fetuses - could hardly be said to be
posterity-oriented or to put "Posterity" on the same level as "selves," in that
it recognized no protectable interests of the portion of posterity in question
(it did, however, recognize a severely qualified and conditioned interest of
the government in potential human life). The Court chose that latter
interpretation, and in doing so (so the argument would go) was not in accord
with the spirit of the Constitution as informed by the "Blessings of Liberty to
.. our Posterity" clause.
A corollary to this second argument would be that a legislature which
chooses to protect "potential" human life from the moment of conception
can hardly be said to be acting against the spirit of the Constitution as that
spirit is informed by the "Blessings of Liberty to ... our Posterity" clause.
Both arguments and the corollary lead inexorably to a clash between two
of the phrases in the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, i.e., the
right to liberty, which may well include a right to privacy in the abortion
decision in the abstract, and the right to life, which according to a reading of
the spirit of the Constitution informed by the "Blessings of Liberty to .. . our
Posterity" clause may well include a right of an unborn yet nonetheless
extant unit of posterity to enter the outer world so that she can enjoy those
blessings.43 In the strongest understanding of this clash, the right to life
42. A third choice was to leave the matter to the legislatures, as Justice Scalia would
have us do, but that choice is not relevant to the perspective being explored in this article.
In that context, however, choosing to leave the matter to the legislatures would amount
merely to a postponement of the interpretive problem. The constitutionality of the
legislatures' work products, be they pro-life, pro-choice, or something in between, would
still have to be assessed in light of the blessings-of-liberty and right-to-life clauses.
43. The more aggressive argument would position that right to life in the "Blessings
of Liberty to . . . our Posterity" clause itself. The less aggressive argument would
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must always trump the right to liberty and can only be undone if the right to
liberty in the equation also happens to amount to a right to life, i.e., if the
continued life of the fetus is a genuine threat to the life of the pregnant
woman. The principle of self-defense in the context of a genuine threat to
one's life would alone justify the taking of the fetus' life. Weaker
understandings are certainly possible. Quality-of-life considerations can be
let into the balance, but only at the risk of turning the "Blessings of Liberty
to . . . our Posterity" clause into a contentless derelict in the text of the
Preamble. What seems evident is that the "Blessings of Liberty to ... our
Posterity" clause identifies us as a people who profess a caring attitude
toward our descendants to the point of announcing formally and solemnly
that the fundamental document of our structured self-government was
ordained and established for their weal as well as ours, and so that they may
enjoy what we enjoy.
THE AUTHORITY OF THE PREAMBLE
One might expect that not much has been written about the Preamble of
the United States Constitution, and even less about the "Blessings of
Liberty" clause, and those suspicions would not be far off the mark. The
"Blessings of Liberty" clause has, however, received fairly recent comment
in Justice Douglas's concurrence in Doe v. Bolton.44 Apart from Justice
Douglas's reference, Justice Harlan referred to the clause in Jacobson v.
Massachusetts:
Although . . . one of the declared objects of the Constitution was to
secure the blessings of liberty to all under the sovereign jurisdiction
and authority of the United States, no power can be exerted to that
end by the United States unless, apart from the Preamble, it be found
in some express delegation of power or in some power to be properly
implied therefrom. 1 Story's Const. sec. 462.
45
position it where it belongs textually, i.e., in the right-to-life clauses in the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, and would only use the "Blessings of Liberty to . . . our
Posterity" clause as an interpretive aid, identifying the spirit and reason behind the
Constitution's recognition of the right to life as being as much Posterity-oriented as
selves-oriented.
44. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 209-15 (1973).
45. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905). Various aspects of the
Preamble are discussed in other decisions of the United States Supreme Court. See
generally Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 471 (1793); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,
14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 324 (1816); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 403 (1819);
Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 247 (1833); League v. DeYoung, 52 U.S. (11 How.)
203 (1850); Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 724 (1869); Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S.
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Justice Harlan's reference to Joseph Story's Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States underscores the basic principle that the
Preamble may not be referred to in order to enlarge the powers given in the
purview of the instrument, but that it is permissible to use the Preamble to
discover the object or purpose of the Framers:
It is an admitted maxim in the ordinary course of the administration of
justice, that the Preamble of a statute is a key to open the mind of the
makers, as to the mischiefs, which are to be remedied, and the objects,
which are to be accomplished by the provisions of the statute . . .
There does not seem any reason, why, in a fundamental law or
constitution of government, an equal attention should not be given to
the intention of the framers, as stated in the Preamble.
46
The example that Justice Story chose to illustrate this principle, although
not in the context of the "Blessings of Liberty" clause, is instructive:
For example, the Preamble declares one object to be, "to provide for
the common defence." . .. [S]uppose the terms of a given power
admit of two constructions the one more restrictive, the other more
liberal, and each of them is consistent with the words, but is, and
ought to be, governed by the intent of the power; if one would
promote, and the other defeat the common defence, ought not the
former, upon the soundest principles of interpretation to be adopted?
Are we at liberty, upon any principles of reason, or common sense, to
adopt a restrictive meaning, which will defeat an avowed object of the
constitution, when another equally natural, and more appropriate to
the object, is before us?
47
If it is fair to paraphrase Justice Story's analysis and apply it to the
"Blessings of Liberty" clause, one might argue the following: Suppose that
the provisions in the Constitution recognizing a right to life admit of two
(12 Wall.) 554 (1871); White v. Hart, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 650 (1872); United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 369 (1886); In re Ross,
140 U.S. 453 (1891); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 106, 139 (1901); Downes v.
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 270 (1901); Ponce v. Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, Porto Rico,
210 U.S. 296 (1908); and Ochoa v. Morales, 230 U.S. 139 (1913). The Jacobson case,
however, is the one that contains the major pronouncements both on the "Blessings of
Liberty" clause and on the interpretive principle with respect to the entire Preamble.
46. STORY, supra note 27.
47. Id. § 221, at 164. The quote here is from the abridged version of Story's
Commentaries. It is not without significance to note that the section referred to here is, in
the differently numbered unabridged version, section 462, i.e., the section cited by Justice
Harlan in the Jacobson case. See id. at xxxvii, conversion table.
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constructions, the one more restrictive, the other more liberal, and each of
them is consistent with the words, but is, and ought to be, governed by the
intent of those provisions; if one would secure, and the other defeat the
securing of the "Blessings of Liberty" to our "Posterity," ought not the
former, upon the soundest principles of interpretation to be adopted?
The question remains as to whether Story's principle of interpretation with
respect to Preambles is indeed sound. Story himself, at one point, referred to
the Preamble somewhat sanguinely as "very important, not only as
explanatory of the motives and objects of framing the Constitution; but as
affording the best key to the interpretation thereof. 4 8 A more contemporary
constitutional scholar, however, while not inconsistent with Story, is
somewhat less sanguine: "The Preamble to the Constitution of the United
States illuminates the objects of the Framers and, thus, can be a guide to
construction, but it is not considered to confer powers or rights., 49 In truth,
the law of legislative interpretation has given Preambles a mixed reception.
The early English cases gave Preambles great weight for statutory
interpretation purposes. The idea that Preambles ought to be used only to
explicate, and not as a source of positive rpowers, seems to have entered our
jurisprudence in the Eighteenth century. 5 That limitation is what brought
the law on Preambles to its present state, recognizing them as useful in
identifying the spirit and reason behind a particular piece of legislation, but
not as conferring positive rights or powers; "[I]t is to the Preamble more
especially that we are to look for the reason or spirit of every statute;
rehearsing . . . as it ordinarily does, . . . in the best and most satisfactory
manner, the object or intention of the legislature .... 52
The lesson from the case law on Preambles in general seems to be that
Preambles are of limited use in legislative interpretation. They are not
ordinarily regarded as controlling when they contradict the purview of the
text, and they cannot be looked to as sources of rights or powers independent
of those specified in the purview. Nevertheless, where there is ambiguity or
48. JOSEPH STORY, A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 45, at 37-38 (1847) (emphasis added).
49. CHESTER JAMES ANTIEU, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION § 2.21, at 31 (1982).
50. See Stowel v. Lord Zouch, (1797) 75 Eng. Rep. 546, 560 (K.B.).
51. See Copeman v. Gallant, (1716) 24 Eng. Rep. 404, 405-07 (Ch.).
52. Brett v. Brett, (1826) 162 Eng. Rep. 456, 458-59 (L.R.A. & E.).
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uncertainty in the purview proper, Preambles can be resorted to as aids in
discovering the spirit and reason behind the rule or principle in question.
5 3
In light of the case law on Preambles in general and on the Preamble of
the Constitution of the United States in particular, it would seem that some
limited use may be made of the "Blessings of Liberty to ... our Posterity"
clause in shedding light on the spirit behind the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments' rights to life and liberty.54  In that context, some
understanding of the "legislative history" behind the Preamble and the
"Blessings of Liberty" clause would be relevant.
The "Blessings of Liberty" clause (it may come as a surprise to some) was
not in any of the early drafts of the Constitution during the Convention of
1787. In fact, it entered very late in the proceedings, in mid-September of
1787, just a few days before the final version of the Constitution was signed
by the delegates and sent to the state ratifying conventions. As of September
8, 1787, the Convention had all but agreed on a final text of the Constitution
when a motion was passed to appoint a committee "to revise the stile of and
53. See generally 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 47.04, at 126-31 (4th ed. 1984). There has been some sentiment to the contrary in the
history of Congress' treatment of the Preamble. In the August 1789 debates over
amending the Constitution to insert a Bill of Rights, a proposal was introduced to insert
the words "Government being intended for the benefit of the people and the rightful
establishment thereof being derived from their authority alone," before "We the People"
in the Preamble. The proposal, of course, was eventually rejected. During the debates,
Thomas Tudor Tucker, the representative from South Carolina, argued that the Preamble
"was no part of the Constitution." Additionally, others, such as Roger Sherman of
Connecticut, argued that the amendment was unnecessary because the "We the People"
language already expressed the principle of the proposed language. Tucker's statement
was, at best, an understatement of the authoritativeness of preambles, even in the case
law of his day. Sherman and those who agreed with him took a position that gave
operative effect to the Preamble. CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY
RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 128-29 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991).
54. It is, of course, a fact that neither the Fifth Amendment's nor the Fourteenth
Amendment's right-to-life clause was in the Constitution at the time of its adoption, but
the amendatory process itself was laid out in the original text (in Article V), and thus it
would be disingenuous to suggest that the Preamble expresses the spirit and reason
behind the original body of the document, but not the spirit and reason behind later
amendments, unless, of course, the later amendment can be understood as abrogating
expressly or impliedly something in the original text. Also, as we shall see, the
legislative history of the "Blessings of Liberty" clause reveals that it is tied in with the
declarations or bills of rights in the various state constitutions, including, of course, their
specific guarantees of rights to life and liberty.
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arrange the articles which had been agreed to by the House." 55  The
Preamble in the version of the draft Constitution that was referred to this
Committee of Style did mention the word "Posterity," but contained no
"Blessings of Liberty" clause:
We the people of the States of New-Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New-York,
New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North-
Carolina, South-Carolina, and Georgia, do ordain, declare and
establish the following Constitution for the Government of Ourselves
and our Posterity.
56
Four days later, on September 12, 1787, the Committee of Style reported
on its work, and presented the Convention with the text of the Constitution
in virtually the form in which we see it today (without the Bill of Rights and
the later amendments, of course), with its present Preamble. The
Convention adopted the Constitution five days later. Historian Carl Van
Doren has referred to the present text of the Preamble as "[t]he most striking
addition made by the Committee of Style." 
57
It is generally acknowledged that the individual author of the Committee
of Style's new Preamble (the one that we see today in the Constitution) was
Gouvemeur Morris of Pennsylvania. 58  Morris undoubtedly would have
been familiar with the Constitution of Pennsylvania of 1776 which, in its
55. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 553 (Max Farrand ed.,
rev. ed. 1937).
56. Id. at 565. Charles C. Nott has suggested that the version quoted here was the
work of Charles Pinckney, the delegate from South Carolina, and was derived from the
Constitution of Massachusetts. CHARLES C. NoTT, THE MYSTERY OF THE PINCKNEY
DRAUGHT 167, 169 (1908). The version quoted here was actually agreed to without
debate by the Convention on August 7, 1787. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 55, at 209; DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE
FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES 482 (Charles C. Tansill ed., 1927).
Jonathan Elliot reports that "[o]n the question to agree to the preamble to the
Constitution, as reported from the committee [of detail] to whom were referred the
proceedings of the Convention, it passed unanimously in the affirmative." 1 THE
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN
1787, at 230-31 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836).
57. CARL VAN DOREN, THE GREAT REHEARSAL: THE STORY OF THE MAKING AND
RATIFYING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 160 (1948).
58. Id
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Preamble, mentioned "posterity" and, in its Declaration of Rights,
mentioned "the blessings of liberty":
[I]t is our indispensable duty to establish such original principles
of government, as will best promote the general happiness of the
people of this state, and their posterity.
A frequent recurrence to fundamental principles, and a firm adherence
to justice, moderation, temperance, industry, and frugality are
absolutely necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty, and keep a
government free ....
Gouverneur Morris may or may not have drawn on the language of his
home state's constitution in drafting the Preamble of the United States
Constitution, but the more interesting question is why he chose to make any
alteration at all in the Committee of Detail's Preamble, especially in view of
the fact that that version of the Preamble had been voted on and already
approved by the Convention.
The history of what happened in the Committee of Style during the four
days in which it worked on and revised the text of the Constitution is not
well recorded and, with respect to the changes in the wording of the
Preamble, even less well recorded. One is left with surmises and inferences
drawn mainly from records of reactions of various delegates to the
Committee's final draft on the floor of the Convention and afterwards.
Perhaps the most strident of the reactions to the change in the wording of the
Preamble came from Luther Martin, the delegate from Maryland, in an
article in the Maryland Gazette on June 3, 1788, nearly a year after the deed
had been done. Martin still felt strongly enough to juxtapose the two
versions of the Preamble (the one in the draft submitted to the Committee of
Style and the one reported out by that committee) and to accuse the
Committee of actually trying to destroy the several state governments
(Martin, of course, was not a signatory to the Constitution and argued
against its approval):
As altered, every appearance of the existing governments, under their
respective Constitutions, is relinquished, the very names struck out,
general purposes and powers given extending to every purpose of the
social compact, and then this Constitution including all these
purposes, is made the Constitution of the United States, without any
reserve of the several States and their Constitutions then existing, and
59. FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 32, at 1541-42 (emphasis
added).
60. See supra text accompanying note 56.
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then this Constitution enacted for these unlimited purposes, we
afterwards find is expressly declared paramount to all Constitutions,
and laws existing in the States.
61
Martin would certainly have agreed with historian Carl Van Doren's
assessment of the present Preamble as "[t]he most striking addition made by
the Committee of Style."62
It seems probable that Luther Martin regarded all the clauses of the
present Preamble together as amounting to something like a national Bill of
Rights preempting all of the states' Declarations and Bills of Rights, when
he wrote of the Preamble's "general purposes and powers... extending to
every purpose of the social compact," i.e., every purpose or reason why
people form governments, and he tied that reference in with a latent
reference to the Supremacy Clause. Elsewhere, however, Luther Martin
wrote of the need of a national Bill of Rights "prefixed to the
Constitution. ' 64 It may be that his objection was as to the overgenerality of
the principles mentioned in the present Preamble, and that what he would
really like to have seen, if state Declarations and Bills of Rights were to be
preempted, was a Preamble that contained a detailed listing of basic rights,
as the national Bill of Rights eventually did. That argument may, however,
be difficult to square with his expressed outrage at the perceived destruction
of states' sovereignty.
The objection that the Constitution, because of its Supremacy Clause,
would render nugatory all states' Declarations of Rights - or at least would
represent a threat of doing so - was well known and vehemently argued at
the time. George Mason, the delegate from Virginia, made the point on the
floor of the Convention several times. In fact, the last time he maneuvered
for the insertion of a national Bill of Rights into the Constitution was on
September 12, 1789, the very day on which the Convention was considering
65the work product of the Committee of Style. The debate records are,
again, sketchy at best, and one wonders how it was that the delegates were
61. SUPPLEMENT TO MAX FARRAND'S THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 291-92 (James H. Hutson ed., 1987) (emphasis in original).
62. VAN DOREN, supra note 57.
63. SUPPLEMENT TO MAX FARRAND'S THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, supra note 61.
64. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 55, at 290 (in
a letter to Oliver Ellsworth, dated March 19, 1788) (emphasis added).
65. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 55, at 587-88.
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persuaded to oppose Mason's Bill-of-Rights maneuver. What can be pieced
together from the records is that Mason raised the point that a Bill of Rights
could be prepared in a few hours and suggested that if anyone were to move
to require one to be inserted in the Constitution, he would second the
motion. Elbridge Gerry took the hint and made the motion. Mason
seconded it. Roger Sherman of Connecticut, however, argued that the state
Declarations of Rights are not repealed by anything in the text of the
Constitution, and those state Declarations of Rights could be trusted to do all
that a national Bill of Rights would do. George Mason countered with his
Supremacy Clause argument, i.e., that national laws were declared to be
paramount over state laws, presumably including state Declarations of
Rights. Sherman's argument won the day, however, as Gerry's motion was
unanimously defeated.66
Mason's Supremacy Clause argument seems quite strong, and one looks
in vain in the records of the debates for a rebuttal. Yet there must have been
one. The only recorded opposition remark was Roger Sherman's seemingly
lame assertion that "the State Declarations of Rights are not repealed by the
constitution."67 More in the way of an explanation must have been given,
and indeed the "unanimous" rejection of Gerry and Mason's motion is not
the whole story; there is a mystery connected with the incident - there may
have been two votes on the question. What seems certain, if only because
66. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 55, at 587-88.
The voting was by states, not by individual delegates.
67. Id. at 588.
68. All the records are not in agreement that Gerry and Mason's motion to add a Bill
of Rights to the final version of the Constitution was rejected unanimously. Bancroft has
noted that manuscripts and printed texts of the records of the Convention "differ in an
astonishing manner." The manuscript version of the Convention's Journal merely
reported that the motion "passed in the negative," without indicating unanimity. James
Madison's manuscript notes recorded a vote often aye, zero nay, and one abstention. Yet
at least two printed versions of the convention's proceedings recorded the vote as
follows:
On the question for a committee to prepare a bill of rights - New Hampshire,
Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, aye - 5; Maryland, Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no - 5; Massachusetts, absent.
JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION KEPT BY JAMES MADISON 717 (E.H. Scott
ed. 1893). Bancroft referred to the anomalous reports as a "change," and indicated that
"[t]he change as yet remains a mystery." 2 GEORGE BANCROFT, HISTORY OF THE
FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 210 n.l (1882).
See also JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION KEPT BY JAMES MADISON 717
(E.H. Scott ed., 1893). Scott's edition of Madison's journal not only reports the five aye,
five nay, one absent vote, but also has George Mason arguing that "a general principle..
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of the mysterious anomaly in the differing reports of the votes on the bill-of-
rights question is that the records do not tell us all that happened, and we are
left with the necessity to surmise and infer.
The question involved in the Mason Bill-of-Rights controversy was as to
how the state Declarations of Rights could be considered secure in view of
the Supremacy Clause's assertion that the laws of the United States made
pursuant to the Constitution were the supreme law of the land, anything in
the Constitution or laws of any state notwithstanding. 69 The records of the
debates on the floor of the Convention, being too sketchy to be useful on the
point, leave one with the uneasy feeling that there must have been some
unrecorded explanation, perhaps hidden in the simple summary of Delegate
Sherman's assertion that the state declarations of rights are not repealed by
anything in the text of the Constitution.
What in the Constitution itself would support the conclusion that the state
Declarations of Rights are not threatened by the Supremacy Clause? The
clue may be in the newly revised Preamble inserted by the Committee of
Style. The new references to establishing justice, promoting the general
welfare, and especially securing the "Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and
our Posterity" are references that are usually found in the bodies of Bills or
Declarations of Rights. It is not difficult to reconstruct the argument that the
state Bills or Declarations of Rights are not undone or threatened by
anything in the new national Constitution because the new national
Constitution unambiguously proclaimed that its purpose is to secure the
blessings of liberty, and not to curtail those blessings. On this line of
reasoning, the purpose of the "Blessings of Liberty" clause was to serve as
an operative buffer preventing the Constitution from being interpreted in
such a way as to affect adversely any basic rights of humankind, or at least
those basic rights that were then secured by state Declarations of Rights, the
• would be sufficient ...and with the aid of the State Declarations, a bill might be
prepared in a few hours." Id. It does not seem inconceivable, in light of the anomalies in
the journals and records, that there were two votes: the tie vote, defeating the motion, of
course, but also representing the accurate viewpoints of the delegations concerning the
need for a bill or declaration of rights, and then, in the aftermath of the tie vote, someone,
probably Roger Sherman (the leader of the opposition to the motion) or Gouverneur
Morris (the drafter of the new preamble), pointing out the existence of the "Blessings of
Liberty" clause and its potential operative effect as a guarantor of the state Declaration of
Rights, and then the second vote unanimously rejecting the motion to prepare a national
Bill of Rights.
69. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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point being that the clause itself was intended from the beginning to have
operative effect as a tool of constitutional interpretation .7
George Mason never abandoned his Supremacy Clause objection to the
Constitution and history records that he refused to sign the Constitution on
that and several other grounds. 71  What is, perhaps, meaningful in the
context of this thesis that the "Blessings of Liberty" clause in the Preamble
might have been intended as a response to Mason's incessant argument that
the Constitution threatened states' Declarations of Rights is that, on the day
after Mason had voiced his strenuous objection, he presented to the
Convention a list of some nineteen suggested revisions of the Committee of
Style's version of the Constitution. Not included in the list was a suggestion
of the need for a national Bill of Rights. 72 The suggestion was renewed on
September 15, two days later, however. 73 Whether the argument that the
"Blessings of Liberty" clause provided the needed national Bill of Rights (if
indeed such an argument was ever made) and gave Mason two days' pause
in his thoughts on the point is not recorded. It is evident that the argument
(again, if it was ever made) did not allay Mason's concern for long.
There is some evidence, however, that Mason did, indeed, vacillate in his
opposition to the Constitution. George Nicholas recounted the incident in a
letter to James Madison, dated April 5, 1788:
Mr. Mason, . . . declared that, notwithstanding his objections to
particular parts of the plan, he would take it as it was rather than lose
it altogether; since that I have reason to believe his sentiments are
70. Alexander Hamilton seemed to see the "Blessings of Liberty" clause in this light,
i.e., as a guarantor of the liberties established in states; bills of rights, and even perhaps as
constituting a national bill of rights all by itself, when he wrote:
Here, in strictness, the people surrender nothing, and as they retain everything,
they have no need of particular reservations. "We the people of the United
States, to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do
ordain and establish this constitution for the United States of America" (sic).
Here is a better recognition of popular rights than volumes of those aphorisms
which make the principal figure in several of our state bills of rights, and which
would sound much better in a treatise of ethics than in a constitution of
government .... [B]ills of rights, in the sense and in the extent in which they
are contended for, are ... unnecessary in the proposed constitution ....
THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton).
71. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 55, at 636-40.
72. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 55, at 269-71.
73. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 55, at 637.
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much changed which I attribute to two causes: first the irritation he
feels from the hard things that have been said of him, and secondly to
the vain opinion he entertains . . . that he has influence enough to
dictate a constitution to Virginia, and through her to the rest of the
Union.
7 4
It will be remembered that George Mason was the author of the Virginia
Declaration of Rights, mentioned earlier.75
Here is the point: If George Mason was, indeed, trying to get the
Convention to adopt a Virginia-type Declaration of Rights for the United
States Constitution, and if the Committee of Style put the clause about
securing the "Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity" into the
Preamble in a last minute (albeit eventually unsuccessful) effort to gain
Mason's support for the final version of the document, as seems likely, then
there would seem to be some connection, in the context of legislative
history, between the "Blessings of Liberty" clause in the present Preamble
and the Virginia Declaration of Rights. It will be remembered that the
Virginia Declaration of Rights, antedating the Declaration of Independence
by a month in 1776, contained perhaps the original reference to "posterity"
in the context of the governmental documents that were emerging from the
freedom movements in the colonies-becoming-states. The references to
"posterity" in the Virginia Declaration are particularly strong:
A Declaration of Rights made by the Representatives of the good
people of Virginia, assembled in full and free convention; which
rights do pertain to them and their posterity, as the basis and
foundation of Government.
1. That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have
certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of
society, they cannot, by any compact deprive or divest their posterity;
namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring
and possessing property, and pursuing and containing happiness and
safety.
76
74. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 55, at 296.
75. See FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 32, at 1908.
76. THE VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, As AGREED TO BY THE VIRGINIA
CONVENTION ON JUNE 12, 1776, reprinted in THE GEORGE MASON LECTURES: HONORING
THE Two HUNDREDTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, app. 20
(1976) (emphasis added). See also FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 32,
at 957.
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If the Virginia Declaration of Rights did inform and influence the
Committee of Style in the drafting of the Preamble of the Constitution of the
United States,77 then it would seem appropriate to look to the Virginia
Declaration for an understanding of the operative force of the use of the term
"posterity." According to the Virginia Declaration, rights to the enjoyment
of life and liberty cannot be ceded to society, nor can persons cede those
rights on behalf of their posterity. The rights to life and liberty are, in the
words of the Declaration of Independence, "unalienable." The meaning is
the same. They cannot be "aliened" or conveyed away to the state or to
anyone else, and this inalienability applies not only to our own basic rights,
but also to those of our posterity. Moreover, the basic rights enumerated in
virtually all Bills or Declarations of Rights invariably include rights to life
and liberty.
In recognizing the right to privacy in the abortion decision on terms so
broad as to amount to a virtually unlimited right to abortion on demand, the
United States Supreme Court, in its Roe and Planned Parenthood decisions,
has failed to secure the blessings of liberty to a portion of our posterity.
Some might be inclined to argue that the Roe decision has deprived a portion
of our posterity of the inalienable right to life. In light of the legislative
history of the "Blessings of Liberty . . . to our Posterity" clause, both
propositions would seem to be tenable. To some, of course, neither
proposition will seem persuasive. What cannot be gainsaid, however, is that
the Roe decision neglected one small bit of relevant input, i.e., the fact that
we, the people, ordained and established the Constitution not only to secure
the blessings of liberty to ourselves, but also to secure those very same
blessings to our "Posterity. "78 Our Constitution proclaims itself to be
77. It is not doubted that some of the immediate verbiage of the Preamble was taken
from Article III of the old Articles of Confederation, which has the states entering into a
"firm league of friendship with each other, for their common defence, the security of their
liberties, and their mutual and general welfare." FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 32, at 8. However, the Constitution's Preamble so clearly speaks to people's
rights, and specifically not states' rights, that the conceptual antecedent cannot possibly
be in the Articles of Confederation. The Articles, because they had no occasion to do so,
did not mention "posterity."
78. Thomas Paine, no stranger to the use of the word "posterity" (he used it ten times
in his 1776 pamphlet COMMON SENSE), once captured the sensibility behind a people's
orientation towards posterity, albeit in a different context and at an earlier time, when he
retold the following anecdote:
I once felt that kind of anger, which a man ought to feel, against the mean
principles that are held by the tories: A noted one, who kept a tavern at Amboy,
was standing at his door, with as pretty a child in his hand, about eight or nine
years old, as I ever saw, and after speaking his mind as freely as he thought was
prudent, finished with this un fatherly expression, "Well, give me peace in my
2008
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posterity-oriented. We, in that Constitution, have proclaimed ourselves to be
a posterity-oriented people. The problem with the Roe decision from a
positivist perspective is that, at best, the decision has failed to take that
textually specific posterity orientation into account; at worst, it has denied it.
In either case the Roe decision is wanting.
THE MORAL IMPORTANCE OF A PRO-LIFE DECISION
7 9
There is a moral flaw in the original Roe decision - a moral flaw that has
been compounded in Planned Parenthood and all the other decisions that
have upheld Roe's essential holding. The moral flaw is easily stated in the
form of an "honest doubt principle," and the "honest doubt principle,"
although moral rather than legal in tone, is logically related to the foregoing
thesis concerning the Preamble of the Constitution. The Preamble contains a
clear indication that those who framed the Constitution wanted it to be
interpreted in a way that secured the Blessings of Liberty (which presumably
would include the blessing of life) not only to themselves but also to their
yet-to-be-born "Posterity." Furthermore, when a question should arise as to
whether any provision of the Constitution should be interpreted in a way in
which the interests of yet-to-be-born posterity would be taken protectively
into account, or in a way in which those interests would be essentially
ignored, the former interpretation should be the one adopted, according to
the intent of the framers. The Constitution contains two references to the
right to life as inuring to persons. As the very existence of a pro-life/pro-
choice debate in our society would indicate, there is at least an "honest
doubt" as to whether a fetus - a representative of our yet-to-be-born
posterity - is a "person" within the meaning of the Constitution. A pro-life
interpretation of the meaning of "person" in the context of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments' right to life, under the guidance of the Preamble's
clause insuring "Blessings of Liberty to . ..our Posterity," resolves that
"honest doubt" in favor of personhood. A pro-choice interpretation of the
meaning of "person" in the context of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments'
day." Not a man lives on the continent but fully believes that a separation must
some time or other finally take place, and a generous parent should have said,
"If there must be trouble, let it be in my own day, that my child may have
peace"; and this single reflection, well applied, is sufficient to awaken every
man to duty.
THOMAS PAINE, THE CRISIS, NUMBER 1 (1776), reprinted in THOMAS PAINE, POLITICAL
WRITINGS 44,45 (Bruce Kulick ed., 1989) (emphasis in original).
79. Much of the material in the following section appeared in Raymond B. Marcin,
The Moral Flaw in the Pro-Choice Position, 4 NATIONAL CATHOLIC BIOETHICS
QUARTERLY No. 4, 701 (2004).
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right to life essentially contravenes the Constitution's commitment to
"Posterity" when it resolves the "honest doubt" against personhood.
Even aside from the text of the Preamble and the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, the "honest doubt principle" expresses a very basic moral
sentiment that is ingrained in natural law theory, and (one might suppose) in
any system of ethics worthy of the appellation - if there is an honest doubt
as to whether any given entity (e.g., a slave, a former slave, a fetus) is a
person, any truly humane and civilized society ought to resolve that doubt in
favor of personhood rather than against it.
It has not been the purpose of this article to make the case for a
philosophical grounding of society's duty towards its "posterity." The case
from moral philosophy would amount to a natural-law-type thesis. As we
have seen, the Supreme Court is not likely to accept a natural law thesis.
This article is confined to a positivist approach, pointing to the acceptance,
by the framers of the Constitution and by the people who accepted it as their
fundamental law, of a purpose of securing the blessings of liberty to their
descendants on into the indefinite future, i.e., an acceptance of the
proposition that the Constitution is to be interpreted in a posterity-oriented
manner. It is one thing, however, to make the case that the Framers and our
constitutional ancestors had that intent, but it is another thing to demonstrate
that that intent is consistent, or at least not inconsistent, with moral theory.
Interpretive principles, however, consistent they may be with original intent,
are suspect in the minds of many if they are inconsistent with moral theory.
To some it may seem obvious, perhaps self-evident, that an extant
generation, acting as a society, has a moral duty to care about, or at least to
avoid harming, the interests of succeeding generations. so The parent-child
analogy raised to the generalized level of society would seem compelling.
The case should, perhaps, nonetheless be made.
One who has made such a case (perhaps inadvertently) is John Rawls.
Rawls, a moral philosopher of the contractarian and Kantian (therefore
rationalist) school, posited the now famous veil-of-ignorance device as part
of his original-position analysis of justice and its fundamental precepts.
Rawls' idea is that the fundamental principles of justice which are to govern
a society can be arrived at by hypothesizing a group of original "justice
seekers" who are motivated by a rational self-interest in trying to come up
with the fundamental principles which will govern them as a society, but
80. Christopher Lasch has observed: "[W]e are fast losing the sense of historical
continuity, the sense of belonging to a succession of generations originating in the past
and stretching into the future." And we are now experiencing an "erosion of any strong
concern for posterity." CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCIssISM 30 (1979),
quoted in R. George Wright, The Interests of Posterity in the Constitutional Scheme, 59
U. CIN. L. REV. 113,125 (1990).
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who are also under a "veil of ignorance" - none of them knows his or her
place in society, social status, or personal attributes, i.e., the factors which
lead to inequality or favoritism, and therefore to injustice. 8 1 The result
should be a rationally arrived at and realistic set of general precepts of
justice.
One of the factors which Rawls specified as being occluded by the veil of
ignorance in this scheme is one's generational identity: "The persons in the
original position have no information as to which generation they belong."
82
In this way, it is thought, no principle of justice will come into being which
is unfair to succeeding generations. It is a way of arriving at
intergenerational justice. None of the justice seekers in the "original
position" will be likely to posit an understanding of justice which will be
unfair to future generations because the hypothetical justice seeker does not
know whether he or she (gender too is unknown) might be a member of the
future generation. Rawls explained, in the context of immediately
succeeding generations:
The question arises. whether persons in the original position have
obligations and duties to third parties, for example, to their immediate
descendants. To say that they do would be one way of handling
questions of justice between generations. However, the aim of justice
as fairness is to derive all duties and obligations from other
conditions, so this way out should be avoided.... What is essential is
that each person in the original position should care about the well-
being of some of those in the next generation, it being presumed that
their concern is for different individuals in each case. Moreover for
anyone in the next generation, there is someone who cares about him
in the present generation. Thus the interests of all are looked after
and, given the veil of ignorance, the whole strand is tied together.
83
81. One might surmise that Rawls took a clue from Rousseau, who defined a nation's
ideal "lawgiver" as:
a superior intelligence, who could understand the passions of men without
feeling any of them, who has no affinity with our nature but knew it to the full,
whose happiness was independent of ours, and who would nevertheless make
our happiness his concern, who would be content to wait in the fullness of time
for a distant glory, and to labor in one age to enjoy the fruits of another.
JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 84 (Maurice Cranston trans., 1968).
Rawls had other precursors as well. See Raymond B. Marcin, Justice and Love, 33 Cath.
U. L. Rev. 363, 372-82 (1984).
82. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 137 (1971).
83. Id. at 128-29.
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In Rawls' scheme of things, one generation does not have a direct
obligation or duty to its immediate descendants. The idea of a direct
obligation or duty would lead to endless arguments over the content of the
obligation or duty. The duty or obligation is derived indirectly through the
use of the original-position device. The end result seems to be an inter-
generational "golden rule"; we must do unto the next generation as we
would do unto ourselves. Just as the biblical Golden Rule specifies no
particular content, yet seems to be bursting with self-evident meaning and
operative significance, so too does this intergenerational application of the
original-position methodology of Rawls seems to lead inexorably to a
forward-looking and progressively protective attitude towards posterity.
Just as, in this article, a relatively modest claim has been advanced with
respect to the interpretation of the "Blessings of Liberty to ... our Posterity"
clause in the Preamble, so too Rawls' application of the original-position
methodology to future generations is relatively modest in scope.
[T]he original position is not to be thought of as a general assembly
which includes at one moment everyone who will live at some time;
or, much less, an assembly of everyone who could live at some time.
It is not a gathering of all actual or possible persons. To conceive of
the original position in either of these ways is to stretch fantasy4 too
far; the conception would cease to be a natural guide to intuition.
In the same way, the argument has been advanced in this article that the
"Blessings of Liberty to.. .our Posterity" clause is best interpreted not as
directly securing those blessings to all yet-to-be-born or yet-to-be-conceived
members of posterity, but rather as an interpretive aid, a posited guide to
intuition when we are faced with fundamental questions as to the meaning
and scope of basic concepts set forth in the Constitution.
Rawls never applied his original-position analysis to the specific problem
that is the subject of this article. His major example was in the area of
economic intergenerational justice.85 His words and his allusions, however,
would seem to have implications in many other contexts: "[l]magining
themselves to be fathers, [the justice-seekers] are to ascertain how much
they should set aside for their sons by noting what they would believe
themselves entitled to claim of their fathers." 86 If justice-seekers are to put
themselves hypothetically in the position of Rawls' yet-to-be-born children
for the purpose of devising economic principles which will be fair to the
next generation, it would seem an afortiori point to suggest that a similar
84. Id. at 139.
85. Id. at 284-93.
86. Id. at 289.
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hypothetical positioning is warranted when the principle at issue is life itself.
Rawls' approach to intergenerational justice has been critiqued8 7  It and
approaches like it have, however, proven useful in theses concerning




Where has the moral flaw in the Roe v. Wade opinion led us? In the
context of the abortion debate in the decades following Roe, our society's set
of values has for some time now, and for unfathomable reasons, awarded
"sensitivity" to those who favor abortion rights, and denied it to those who
favor protecting the lives of pre-birth children. The "honest doubt principle"
aside, there is, undoubtedly, sensitivity among those who hold to the pro-
choice position, ranging from whatever sensitivity and comfort the
fundamentalist absolutism that some in the pro-choice movement may be
able to draw from their unblinking zeal all the way to the sensitivity and
comfort derived from an honest pro-choice admission of the tragedy and
perhaps horror that accompanies the recognition of what abortion truly is.
Many pro-choice advocates are now opting for one version or another of the
latter vantage point - an honest recognition of what an abortion truly
involves.
It is recently, and principally in the context of the national debate over
partial-birth abortion,89 that our society has begun to recognize a sensitivity
on the pro-life side of the ledger. Partial-birth abortions are not only
horrible to contemplate; we are beginning to sense that they are very likely
horribly painful to the all-but-completely-born child. Research published in
the prestigious British medical journal The Lancet in 1994 concluded that at
some time during the second trimester, human fetuses exhibit all the
physiological indications that would justify a finding of pain in a newborn
baby. The article ends with a humane but somewhat startling suggestion:
Just as physicians now provide neonates with adequate analgesia, our
findings suggest that those dealing with the fetus should consider
making similar modifications to their practice. This applies not just to
diagnostic and therapeutic procedures on the fetus, but possibly also
87. See Richard A. Epstein, Justice Across the Generations, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1465-66
(1989).
88. Wright, supra note 80, at 125, and authorities cited therein.
89. See generally Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124.
God's Littlest Children and the Right to Live
to termination of pregnancy, especially by surgical techniques
involving dismemberment.
90
The technical language of science sometimes masks the horror of a
reality: fetal children in the womb, The Lancet article tells us, feel pain
(surely one must be alive in order to feel pain), and physicians should
consider anaesthetizing them whenever they dismember them - alive - in the
womb. According to the medical scientists cited by the American Life
League, the neuro-anatomical structures that are needed in order to "feel"
pain, i.e., the thalamus and the motor nerves that send a message to the base
of the brain, are present in the fetus by the eighth week of pregnancy.91
Some physicians, however, say that the fetus, at the eighth week, would not
be capable of experiencing what adult human beings perceive as pain,
because the nerve connections between the thalamus and the cerebral cortex
are not developed enough until the twenty-sixth week of pregnancy.92 Other
physicians agree with the authors of The Lancet article, and would place the
onset of the pain experience as early as that eighth week, arguing that the
cortex is not involved in the experience of pain.
What if we were to apply the "honest-doubt" moral sensitivity to the issue
of fetal pain? Even if there is only an honest doubt as to whether a child in
the womb feels pain (and The Lancet findings would seem to place the issue
in the area of honest doubt), any truly humane and civilized society would
and should resolve that doubt in favor of the thesis that fetuses do feel pain.
90. Xenophon Giannakoulopoulos, Waldo Sepulveda, Ploutarchos Kourtis, Vivette
Glover & Nicholas M. Fisk, Fetal Plasma Cortisol and f-endorphin Response to
Intrauterine Needling, 344 LANCET 77, 80 (1994) (internal footnote omitted).
91. AMERICAN LIFE LEAGUE, FETAL PAIN: AN AGONIZING REALITY (2005),
http://www.all.org/article.php?id= 10113.
92. See, e.g., Stuart W. G. Derbyshire, Can Fetuses Feel Pain?, 332 BRIT. MED. J.
909, 909-10 (2006).
93. See, e.g., AMERICAN LIFE LEAGUE, supra note 91; JOHN C. WILLKE & BARBARA
H. WILLKE, WHY NOT LOVE THEM BOTH?: QUESTIONS & ANSWERS ABOUT ABORTION 94-
99 (1997). Jean A. Wright, M.D., M.B.A., has stated that "[u]nbom infants have pain
receptors on their face by seven weeks of development, and over their entire body by the
twentieth week of gestation in the same or greater density than adults." Jean A. Wright,
Advances in the Understanding of Fetal Pain, 9 THEOLOGY MATTERS 4, 4 (2003). Dr.
Wright also expressed the opinion that "[i]t takes less of a noxious stimulus to create pain
in the unborn child," because although "[t]he fibers and substances needed to feel pain
are present.. the mechanisms needed to modulate and tone down the response to pain are
poorly developed." Id. at 6.
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It is sometimes argued, however, that anesthesia administered to the
mother during the abortion procedure also anesthetizes the baby. This
argument came up prominently and was as prominently refuted during the
early debates over the federal proposal to ban partial-birth abortions. Dr.
Jean A. Wright, Associate Professor of Pediatrics and Anesthesia at Emory
University's School of Medicine, testified that "local anesthetics rarely have
any effect on the fetus." 94  Dr. Wright went on to explain: "The
administration of intravenous sedation/anesthesia has minimal effects on the
unborn due to two mechanisms: 1) The mother's liver clears much of the
drug, and 2) the drug must cross from the mother's blood stream into the
placenta before reaching the fetus."
95
It is difficult to argue that the abortion techniques currently in use do not
involve pain - unspeakable pain if indeed the child indeed feels it. Even
pro-abortion advocates seem to be recognizing it, albeit grudgingly. Pro-
choice activist Naomi Wolf wrote in an issue of The New Republic several
years ago:
[F]eminism at its best is based on what is simply true .... While
images of violent fetal death work magnificently for pro-lifers as
political polemic, the pictures are not polemical in themselves: they
are biological facts .... We know this .... To insist that the truth is
in poor taste is the very height of hypocrisy.
96
A self-proclaimed pro-choice physician in Great Britain, Professor Vivette
Glover of the Queen Charlotte's and Chelsea Hospital in London, has
concluded that, "[b]etween seventeen and twenty-six [weeks] it is
increasingly possible that [the fetus] starts to feel something and that
abortions done in that period ought to use anesthesia."
97
Back in 1984, after President Reagan had made the statement publicly that
fetuses often feel pain during abortion procedures, the reaction from the pro-
choice community was, predictably, derisively dismissive. In response to
that derisively dismissive reaction, twenty-six professors and practitioners of
94. Jean A. Wright, M.D., Testimony before the House of Representatives
Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Hearing on Partial Birth
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obstetrics, gynecology, fetal medicine, and pediatrics, including two past
presidents of the American Academy of Obstetrics, wrote an open letter to
the President, advising him, with appropriate citations to medical
developments in ultrasonography, fetoscopy, and the study of fetal
electrocardiograms and electroencephalograms (EKGs and EEGs), that "in
drawing attention to the capability of the human fetus to feel pain, you stand
on firmly established ground."
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The point in all this is not that the fetus definitely feels pain at the eighth
week, or the seventeenth week, or the twenty-sixth week. The point is that
there is an honest doubt, and the oddly inexplicable thing about the influence
of the pro-choice movement on our society's and other societies' approach
to the question of fetal pain has been that our society and other societies
have resolved that honest doubt against the conclusion that fetuses can feel
pain at any point in the pregnancy, up to and including the nearly full-term
partial-birth abortions.
Abortion methods may be distasteful to our sensibilities, but they are
biological facts, and they must be examined if the morally important
questions of fetal pain and fetal personhood are to be looked into seriously
and not polemically. The following are descriptions of abortion methods
used today:
(1) The suction-aspiration or vacuum-curettage technique commonly
used in early pregnancies, and most often at or after the eighth week,
involves the violent tearing and dismemberment of the fetus by a
powerful suction tube with cutting edges.
(2) The dilation-and-curettage method (D&C), also used during the
first trimester, and again most often at or after the eighth week,
involves cutting the baby's body into pieces with a loop-shaped steel
knife, and scraping the body parts into a basin.
(3) The RU-486 method, also used during the first trimester, involves
the ingestion of two synthetic hormones which block the action of the
natural hormone that provides nutrients to the lining of the uterus,
thus starving the fetus, and then the induction of labor and the
expulsion of the fetus from two to five days later.
(4) The methrotrexate procedure is similar to the RU-486 method,
except that the synthetic hormones are injected intramuscularly
instead of taken in pill form.
(5) The dilation-and-evacuation method (D&E), commonly used after
twelve weeks and up to twenty-four weeks, involves twisting and
tearing the baby's body parts off with forceps with sharp metal jaws,
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snapping the baby's spine, and crushing her skull for easier
evacuation. The fetus dies in the same way that an adult human being
would die, bleeding to death while being torn limb from limb.
(6) The saline-injection method, or saline amniocentesis, commonly
used after sixteen weeks and through the third trimester, involves the
injection into the amniotic sac surrounding the baby of a poisonous,
burning solution and is accompanied by violent fetal kicks and jerks
as the baby is burned alive.
(7) The urea and prostaglandin chemical methods, used in the second
and third trimesters, essentially involve the premature inducement of
labor and the delivery and subsequent neglect of fetal babies. These
methods are in some disfavor because not infrequently the baby
survives.
(8) The partial-birth abortion technique, known medically as dilation
and extraction (D&X), is used in late-term abortions (beyond the
fifteenth week and up to the point of full term). It involves the
delivery into the open, in the breech position, of the legs, arms, and
torso (all but the head) of the baby, the stabbing of the points of
surgical scissors into the base of the skull of the all-but-delivered
baby, the insertion of a suction device into the stab hole, the suction
removal of the baby's brain, the crushing of the emptied skull, and
then the completion of the delivery of the corpse of the baby. If the
baby herself cannot cry out, this business of aborting fetal children
itself cries out to any sane society for moral review and analysis.
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Mother Teresa of Calcutta once said, with obvious reference to the United
States (she made the remark at the National Prayer Breakfast in Washington,
D.C.): "Any country that accepts abortion is not teaching its people to love,
but to use any violence to get what they want. This is why the greatest
destroyer of love and peace is abortion."' 10 The then-Surgeon General of the
United States, Jocelyn Elders, later verbalized one of the pro-choice
movement's responses to Mother Teresa: "We would like for the right-to-
life and anti-choice groups to really get over their love affair with the
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fetus."'' It is perhaps the single greatest moral judgment on our society that
we seem, up to now, to have adopted Jocelyn Elders' sensitivity in the
abortion debate, rather than Mother Teresa's.
CONCLUSION
If Roe is to be overturned, the decision overturning it will almost certainly
be positivist in tone, i.e., confined to fair interpretations of the concepts and
principles announced in the Constitution itself. If, beyond being positivist in
tone, it is also thorough in scope and takes into account the Constitution's
expressed value orientation towards posterity's entitlement to the right to
live and to enjoy the Blessings of Liberty, it may be a pro-life decision as
well.
101. Floyd G. Brown, Life and Death in Arkansas, NATIONAL REVIEW, Apr. 26, 1993,
at 38, 40.
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